Grading Trump\u27s China Trade Strategy by Charnovitz, Steve
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Grading Trump's China Trade Strategy 
Steve Charnovitz 
George Washington University Law School, scharnovitz@law.gwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charnovitz, Steve, Grading Trump's China Trade Strategy (2019). GWU Law School Public Law Research 
Paper No. 2019-26; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2019-26. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3393083 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Grading Trump's China Trade Strategy 
Steve Charnovitz* 
Content 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
2 Overview of US Complaints About China ............................................................. 4 
3 Detailed Examination of US Complaints ................................................................ 7 
3.1 Analytical Methodology ................................................................................... 7 
3.2 The 20 Charges Individually Examined ........................................................... 8 
3.3 Overall Findings ............................................................................................. 30 
4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 32 
References ..................................................................................................................... 36 
Abstract Although much has been written about the ongoing trade war between China and 
the United States from 2017 to early 2019, this literature omits detailed examination of the 
substance of the US trade complaints about China. This article seeks to fill that gap in the 
literature by unpacking the 20 most prominent complaints that are being levelled by the 
Trump Administration. The article finds that half of the complaints involve behaviour that 
is contrary to WTO rules and yet the Trump Administration has lodged only three WTO 
cases against that behaviour. The Trump Administration justifies this omission on the 
ground that WTO dispute settlement is not capable of resolving legal complaints against 
China's nonmarket economy and that many of the Chinese measures characterized in this 
article as WTO-illegal are actually permitted by the WTO. The article suggests that the real 
reason why the Administration chose not to bring multiple new WTO cases against China 
is that the Administration prefers to confront China with power-based measures in the form 
of unilateral tariffs. Moreover, robust WTO dispute settlement is viewed by the Trump 
Administration as unwanted international control over disguised trade protectionism long 
favoured by US trade officials.  
1 Introduction 
United States (US) President Donald J. Trump and his Administration have made China 
their top trade target.1 Pronouncing US trade with China to be unfair, Trump Administration 
*Prof. Steve Charnovitz, George Washington University, USA. Forthcoming, European Yearbook of
International Economic Law 2019.  This article is current as of 19 April 2019 and sources from the internet
were accessed on this date.
1 To be sure, Trump's fixation on China's economic policies is misplaced as the US has greater interests in 
securing from China more accommodating policies on regional security and climate change. Cooperation with 
China is especially vital on climate change to address classic market and government failures.  
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officials in July 2018 began imposing a 25% tariff on $50 billion of imports from China 
pursuant to the statutory authority in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.2 The Section 
301 authority provides for negotiations with the target country,3 and in December 2018, the 
Administration announced a pause in raising tariffs pending new talks with China.4 As of 
mid-April 2019, these China-US negotiations are ongoing, but President Trump has 
revealed that even if a trade deal with China is achieved, the US tariffs may stay in place 
for a "substantial period of time."5 
The Trump Administration justified the original Section 301 actions as an attack on four 
types of behaviour by the Chinese government: (1) forced technology transfer in China, (2) 
involuntary licensing requirements in China, (3) technology acquisitions by China in the 
United States, and (4) cyber and intellectual property theft by China in the United States.6 
After China retaliated against the first tranche of Section 301 tariffs, the Administration, in 
September 2018, imposed 10% tariffs on $200 billion worth of imports from China.7 
Besides China, President Trump has hurled criticism at several additional trade targets 
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the European Union (EU). 
The competition for pride of place after China has stayed tight, but, as I see it, the 
Administration's second biggest trade target is the WTO Appellate Body.8 Trump's Office 
of the US Trade Representative (USTR) relentlessly attacks the Appellate Body: 
For many years, the WTO Appellate Body repeatedly seized more power for itself – while 
undermining and disregarding the very rules under which the dispute system was created.9  
The Appellate Body's approach "fails to apply the WTO rules as written and agreed to by the United 
States and other WTO Members."10 
The "WTO Appellate Body has repeatedly sought to create new obligations not covered in WTO 
Agreements."11 
[E]fforts by the Appellate Body to create new obligations are not legitimate.12
We will not allow the WTO Appellate Body and dispute settlement system to force the United States 
into a straitjacket of obligations to which we never agreed.13  
2 19 USC § 2415(a)(1). 
3 19 USC § 2465(a). 
4 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 21. Prior to the pause, the 
Administration had threatened to raise the tariff levels and to impose tariffs on more imports from China.   
5 Davis B, Ballhaus R, Trump says tariffs on Chinese goods will stay on for 'substantial period of time'. Wall 
Street Journal, 21 March 2019. 
6 USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. See Nos. 
1, 6, 18 and 20 below. Navarro P, Trump's tariffs are a defense against China's aggression. Wall Street Journal, 
21 June 2018, p. A17. 
7 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 20 
8 Nixon S, Trump puts the WTO on the ropes. Wall Street Journal, 11 July 2018. The Appellate Body serves 
as the WTO's appellate tribunal. 
9 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6.  
10 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26. 
11 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26. 
12 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26. 
13 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27. 
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In my view, all of these complaints lack validity. Even worse is USTR's absurd complaint 
that "judicial activism" by the Appellate Body is an "important reason for the failure of the 
multilateral negotiations" at the WTO.14 USTR also objects to the Appellate Body's long-
time rule allowing an appellator hearing an appeal to continue doing so even if her term 
expires during the appeal. Abandoning this rule would delay many Appellate Body 
proceedings, and so there is no small contradiction in the fact that USTR also objects to 
tardy Appellate Body rulings. 
The Trump Administration's twin criticisms of China and the Appellate Body feed off each 
other. To wit: 
The Appellate Body's "activism had the disastrous effect of making it harder for market-
based countries like the United States to push back against unfair trade practices abroad 
[...]."15 
We will resist efforts by China – or any other country – to hide behind international bureaucracies 
in an effort to hinder the ability of the United States to take robust actions, when necessary, in 
response to unfair practices abroad.16  
China and other WTO Members have put forth proposals that endorse changing the rules of WTO 
dispute settlement to accommodate and authorize the very WTO Appellate Body actions that the 
United States has protested.17 
Instead of constraining market distorting countries like China, the WTO has in some cases given 
them an unfair advantage over the United States and other market based economies.18  
Although the United States can readily utilize Section 301 tariffs to sanction China, Section 
301 cannot be utilized to sanction the Appellate Body. Instead, USTR has sought to put the 
WTO appellate court out of business by objecting to the replacement of Appellate Body 
members when their judicial terms expire. Currently, four of the seven seats on the 
Appellate Body are vacant as a result of the refusal of the US representative to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to join the consensus needed to commence the appointment 
process.  
Both forms of the Trump Administration's economic aggression are inconsistent with WTO 
rules. The Section 301 tariffs against China violate Articles I and II of the WTO's General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The refusal by the United States to appoint new 
judges is inconsistent with the procedural requirement in Article 17.2 of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) that "Vacancies shall be filled as they arise."19  
These twin USTR assaults undermine prosperity and the rule of law. The reciprocal trade 
sanctions between China and the US will reduce economic growth in both economies. The 
14 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6. 
15 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 6. 
16 USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 4. 
17 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27. 
18 USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 2. 
19 Petersmann (2018), p. 187. 
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US tariff actions are protectionist in practice20 by inhibiting imports in the short run and by 
realigning production and supply chains in the long-run (that are a wellspring of China's 
economic clout). The disruption of the Appellate Body has hindered the ability of countries 
to secure WTO decisions in a timely fashion so to induce other countries to adhere to their 
WTO obligations. For the same reasons, these dual assaults can harm the economic interests 
of the rest of the world, particularly those countries that regularly use WTO dispute 
settlement. On the other hand, the supply chain disruptions can also shift investment and 
production from China to third-country beneficiaries. 
In parallel to the Trump Administration's trade complaints about China, the Administration 
has criticized the Paris climate accord for being an "unfair" agreement that would favour 
China over the United States. In announcing that he would withdraw the US from the Paris 
Agreement, Trump alleged that the climate accord would allow China to increase its 
emissions for 13 years even though the United States could not.21 Back in 2012, Trump had 
famously declared that "the concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese 
in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive."22 
For climate, trade, and many other fields, US unilateralism is not just a means, but rather is 
a central part of the Administration's conception of a good world order. As Adam Tooze 
has noted, "As far as the American trade hawks are concerned, competition within an agreed 
international order is to be welcomed only so long as the competitors agree to play by 
America's rules, both economic and geopolitical."23 Likewise USTR: " The United States 
will not allow the WTO – or any other multilateral organization – to prevent us from taking 
actions that are essential to the economic well-being of the American people."24 
2 Overview of US Complaints About China 
Although the Trump Administration has not produced a white paper detailing exactly what 
it considers China to be doing wrong on trade, one can stitch together a bill of complaint 
from various statements by President Trump, the White House, USTR, and other parts of 
the Trump Administration.25 China is accused of numerous examples of "unfair" trade 
practices and "economic aggression" against the United States.26 Precisely what renders the 
named practices "unfair" goes unexplained.  
20 USTR denies that the Trump Administration is engaging in protectionism. Lighthizer, at APEC, says 
defending U.S. market against unfair trade is not protectionism. World Trade Online, 21 May 2017.  
21 White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, 1 June 2017. 
22 https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en 
23 Tooze A, Is this the end of the American century? London Review of Books 41(7), 4 April 2019, 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n07/adam-tooze/is-this-the-end-of-the-american-century 
24 USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report, March 2018, p. 2. 
25 For a US private sector analysis, see Business Roundtable, Recommendations for Chinese reforms to 
address trade and investment barriers, July 2018, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/archive/letters/BRT%20China%20Priorities.pdf 
26 White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump's Actions Responding to China's 
Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018; White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential 
Memorandum Targeting China's Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018; White House, Statement by the 
President Regarding Trade with China, 15 June 2018. 
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Trump's grievances against China are manifold, but for the purposes of this article can 
summarized in the following 20 charges:27 
1. The government of China "is forcing United States companies to transfer technology 
to Chinese counterparts."28 "Beijing now requires many American businesses to 
hand over their trade secrets as the cost of doing business in China."29 
2. "Chinese industrial policy" seeks to "capture industries of the future" through 
several means such as public investment and export restraints on critical raw 
materials.30 "China's unfair industrial policies, like the 'Made in China 2025' policy 
initiative, clearly state China's goal of taking away domestic and international 
market share from foreigners."31 "Too often, China flouts the rules to achieve 
industrial policy objectives."32 
3. China imposes "discriminatory non-tariff barriers."33 China protects its home 
market with "high tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and other regulatory hurdles."34  
4. "China has banned imports of United States agricultural products such as poultry."35 
5. China uses "market-distorting forces, including subsidies and state-owned 
enterprises" to promote "excess capacity" and "overproduction of steel and 
aluminium".36  
6. China requires US companies to license intellectual property "at less than economic 
value."37  
7. "China disregards many of its WTO's transparency obligations [...]."38 
8. "China has been a particularly bad actor when it comes to trade remedies."39 
9. "China is increasingly attempting to force foreign enterprises to localize valuable 
data or information within China [...]."40 
                                               
27 If the list were going over 20, this study would have included currency manipulation and weak enforcement 
of US intellectual property rights.  
28 White House, Statement from the President, 17 September 2018. 
29 White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence to the Hudson Institute on the Administration's Policy 
Toward China, 4 October 2018. 
30 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, pp. 2, 16. 
31 White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump's Actions Responding to China's 
Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018. 
32 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8. 
33 White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018. 
34 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1. 
35 White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018. 
36 White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018; White 
House, Statement of the United States Regarding China Talks, 31 January 2019. 
37 White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018. 
38 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 9. 
39 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8. 
40 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 8.  
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10. China imposes "unfair retaliation" against the Trump Administration's Section 301 
tariffs.41 China's retaliation against the Trump Administration's Section 232 steel 
and aluminium tariffs "appears to be inconsistent with China's [WTO] obligations 
[...]."42  
11. China continues to follow a "state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and 
trade, despite WTO members' expectations – and China's own representations – that 
China would transform its economy and pursue the open, market-oriented policies 
endorsed by the WTO."43 "WTO membership comes with expectations that an 
acceding member not only will strictly adhere to WTO rules, but also will support 
open, market-oriented policies," and "China has failed to comply with these 
expectations."44 
12. China exhibits the largest trade "deficit of any country in the history of our world"45 
and the "trade relationship between the United States and China must be much more 
equitable."46 "I have great respect and affection for my friend President Xi, but I 
have made clear that our trade imbalance is just not acceptable."47 
13. "The United States will request that tariffs and taxes between the two countries 
[China and US] be reciprocal in nature and value."48 "China imposes much higher 
tariffs on United States exports than the United States imposes on China.49 "If they 
charge us, we charge them the same thing. That's the way it's got to be."50 
14. Projects in China's Belt and Road Initiative "generally ignore market principles and 
fail to adhere to internationally accepted best practices in financing, infrastructure 
development and government procurement."51 
15. China "has already achieved a leading position in many traditional manufacturing 
industries" through several methods including "lax and weakly enforced 
environmental and health and safety standards."52 
                                               
41 White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, 5 
April 2018. 
42 WTO, China – Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, Request for Establishment of 
a WTO Panel by the United States, WT/DS558/2, 19 October 2018. 
43 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 2. 
44 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p.3. 
45 White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's 
Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018. 
46 White House, Statement from the President Regarding Trade with China, 18 June 2018. 
47 White House, Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
New York, 25 September 2018. 
48 White House, Statement on Steps to Protect Domestic Technology and Intellectual Property from China's 
Discriminatory and Burdensome Trade Practices, 29 May 2018. 
49 White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018. 
50 White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's 
Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018. 
51 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 15.  
52 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1. 
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16. China uses a "predatory 'debt trap' model" to "secure and control core global 
resources globally."53 
17. "China's policies are contributing to a dramatic misallocation of global resources 
that leaves everyone – including the Chinese people – poorer than they would be in 
a world of more efficient markets." 54 
18. "China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition 
of, U.S. companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and 
generate the transfer of technology to Chinese companies."55 
19. China uses "corporate governance" law "as a tool to advance China's strategic goals, 
rather than simply, as is the custom of international rules, to advance the profit-
maximizing goals of the enterprise."56 
20. China seeks to "obtain technology from American companies" by "intellectual 
property theft" and "cyber theft."57 "Chinese security agencies have masterminded 
the wholesale theft of American technology — including cutting edge military 
blueprints."58 "China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft 
from, the computer networks of U.S. companies to access their sensitive commercial 
information and trade secrets."59 
 
3 Detailed Examination of US Complaints 
3.1 Analytical Methodology 
Part 3 of this article examines the merits of the US complaints about China. Ideally, such 
an analysis would begin by analysing the veracity of each charge. Here, for reasons of space, 
such a factual examination is beyond the scope of this article. Yet for a few of the charges, 
the facts are clear enough to evaluate the validity of the charge.60 For the rest of the charges, 
they will be presumed true even though in some instances the Trump Administration has 
put forward little or no corroborating evidence.  
The Trump Administration's denouncement of China diverges from the usual practice in 
contemporary international relations of assuming good faith and expecting a complaining 
state to produce evidence for its allegation in an international body or in the court of public 
opinion. As the WTO Appellate Body has explained, "it is a generally accepted canon of 
evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, in most jurisdictions, that the burden of 
                                               
53 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1. 
54 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 4. 
55 USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. 
56 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 11.  
57 White House, President Donald J. Trump is Confronting China's Unfair Trade Policies, 29 May 2018; Mike 
Pompeo, Remarks by Secretary Pompeo on America's Economic Revival at Detroit Economic Club, 18 June 
2018. 
58 White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence to the Hudson Institute on the Administration's Policy 
Toward China, 4 October 2018. 
59 USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. 
60 See below Nos. 8 (Trade remedies), 9 (Data localization), 10 (Retaliation), and 12 (Trade deficit). 
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proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative 
of a particular claim or defence."61  
For those charges for which the United States has not lodged a complaint at any 
international fact-finding body, the public could reasonably draw the adverse inference that 
the claim against China is untrue. That is because if it were true, the Trump Administration 
would have been eager to vindicate its claim before an independent fact-finding tribunal.  
Positing an adverse inference from non-litigation is especially appropriate in the WTO 
context because trade law makes use of adverse inferences.  
With the top 20 charges now teed up, the study will proceed by analysing each of them. For 
each charge, the study will report on whether such behaviour by China violates WTO law.62 
The study will also report on whether such behaviour by China is wrongful.  A WTO 
violation is inherently wrongful. Yet, the indicated behaviour could also be wrongful – for 
example, for moral or economic reasons – even if the behaviour does not violate WTO law. 
Next, the study will consider whether WTO negotiations are needed to institute new norms 
to correct behaviour that is not WTO-illegal. If the WTO is not the right organization to 
craft such norms, the study will consider whether another international organization would 
be more suitable. For each charge against China, the study will note and evaluate the 
response being taken by the Trump Administration to remedy the problem. Finally, if a 
successful strategy is not currently being pursued, the study will point to a better strategy.  
 
3.2 The 20 Charges Individually Examined 
1. Forced technology transfer. 
A Chinese government measure to force a US company to "hand over" its technology or 
trade secrets violates WTO law. Although the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) permits compulsory licensing, a taking of foreign 
technology without compensation could violate TRIPS Articles 26, 28, 36, and 39. A taking 
of trade secrets could violate TRIPS Article 39.2. 
Besides the regular TRIPS rules, China has numerous additional WTO accession 
obligations that apply only to China. These applicant WTO-plus obligations are found in 
China's Accession Protocol63 and Working Party report.64 Two unique obligations in the 
Working Party report (paras. 49, 203) prohibit forced technology transfer.65  
The Trump Administration has not lodged a WTO case against China regarding charge No 
1. Instead, the Administration maintains that "Many of the worst actions undertaken by 
China – such as the numerous informal methods of pressuring U.S. companies to share their 
technology with Chinese partners – were not captured by China's obligations at the WTO."66 
                                               
61 United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, Report of the 
Appellate Body, WT/DS233/AB/R, p. 14 (adopted 23 May 1997). 
62 When this article states that a measure by China or the United States violates the WTO, that is a prediction 
of what a WTO tribunal would rule should a well pleaded claim be brought to WTO dispute settlement. 
63 WTO, Protocol of the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 November 2001. 
64 Charnovitz (2008); Ehring (2014). 
65 WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001. 
66 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 7. 
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Count me as sceptical that a government can escape liability under WTO law merely by 
using informal pressure rather than formal pressure. 
In its Section 301 action, USTR contends that "China uses foreign ownership restrictions, 
such as joint venture requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various administrative 
review and licensing processes, to require or pressure technology transfer from U.S. 
companies."67 Imposing such requirements, limitations, and processes is subject to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to the extent that it implicates mode 3 
commercial presence services. GATS Articles XVI and XVII contain disciplines for China 
that are supplemented by additional obligations in China's WTO-plus rulebook. 
Notwithstanding these causes of action, the Trump Administration has failed to lodge a 
GATS case against China. 
In lieu of a legal challenge, the Trump Administration's strategy against forced technology 
transfer is to impose Section 301 sanctions.68 By forgoing WTO litigation, which would be 
the first-best instrument to secure constructive change in China, the Trump Administration 
is left only with inferior instruments. Even worse, because the Section 301 sanction violates 
WTO law, the Trump Administration undermines its narrative about China's misbehaviour. 
If a US sanction is considered to be politically necessary in US politics, then the sanction 
should have been crafted to be consistent with WTO law and to communicate that China's 
forced technology transfer is malum in se. In addition, the Administration could have 
championed new WTO negotiations to strengthen the rules against forced technology 
transfer by making clearer when ostensibly voluntary contracts cross the line into coercion. 
 
2. Chinese industrial policies. 
Public investment is often carried out via subsidies. An industrial policy using subsidies 
that cause adverse trade effects on other WTO members violates Article 5 of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). In my view, WTO anti-
subsidy law may be weaker in practice than it should be because of some regrettable DSB 
holdings that make it harder to show a financial contribution from a public body and to 
show a benefit from a subsidy to an enterprise.69 Nevertheless, WTO subsidy law remains 
robust. Moreover, in joining the WTO, China took on several stricter obligations regarding 
industrial policy subsidies as codified in its Protocol (para. 10.2) and Working Party report 
(paras. 167, 171-2).  
Using export restraints violates GATT Article XI. China has already lost two WTO cases 
(Raw Materials and Rare Earths) regarding WTO-illegal export restraints. Moreover, China 
has tougher legal obligations on export restraints than do most (or all) other WTO members. 
Thus, depending on the facts, a Chinese industrial policy utilizing subsidies or export 
restraints could violate WTO rules. Although disturbingly bereft of any legal analysis, the 
US International Trade Commission (USITC) issued a report in December 2017 holding 
that China's industrial policies on solar cells "directly contradicted the obligations that 
                                               
67 USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. 
68 USTR, Notice of Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301, 83 F.R. 14907, 6 April 2018. 
69 Ding (2014); Rovnov (2019). 
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China committed to undertake as part of its WTO accession."70  The Trump Administration 
was quick to use the USITC report as justification to impose US tariff protection on solar 
cells, but the Administration did not pursue the cause of action against China suggested by 
the USITC. 
Employing an industrial policy is not inherently wrongful.71 Indeed, an industrial policy 
that merely invites private investment in a key industry would neither be wrongful nor a 
WTO violation. When governments pursue industrial policy, the instrument of subsidy may 
be appropriate to provide social benefits, particularly in the presence of a market failure. 
Although the SCM Agreement recognizes the potentially constructive role of subsidies,72 
there remains an unresolved legal tension between domestic policy space and the SCM 
disciplines that regulate such space.73  
If governments limited their industrial policies to subsidies, the externalities could be 
manageable. Yet a common problem with industrial policy is that governments prefer 
cheaper means that use non-spending instruments such as trade measures. The use of import 
or export restraints can externalize high net costs on other countries.  
The Trump Administration objects to China's pursuit of industrial policies to capture 
industries of the future, but from my perspective, such pursuit is a lot smarter than the 
Trump Administration's industrial policies to preserve industries of the past. The 
Administration's misuse of Section 232 tariffs to increase the capacity utilization of the 
domestic steel industry is naked industrial policy. Speaking of the effect of those steel 
tariffs, Trump has bragged that "what’s happening with the steel industry is very exciting 
to me. It’s being rebuilt overnight."74 The Administration's use of Section 201 tariffs to 
protect the washing machine and solar panel industries is another example of backward-
looking industrial policy.75 
The Administration's claim that it is "unfair"76 for China to seek to take away domestic and 
international market share from the United States is facetious at best. Chinese producers 
have every right to compete to expand their market share just as US producers do. US 
producers have no vested right to their existing share of the domestic market or a foreign 
market. In a market-based economy, producers have to earn their share every day.  
                                               
70 Supplemental Report of the U.S. International Trade Commission Regarding Unforeseen Developments, 
28 December 2017, https://solarbuildermag.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ITC_Report_Suniva.pdf 
71 Charnovitz (1993–94), p. 88. 
72 See, for example, Articles 8 (expired), 25.3, 27.13, 27.14, 29.1. 
73 Meyer (2018), pp 538–539. 
74 White House, Press Conference by President Trump, 27 September 2018. More recently, Trump declared: 
"The steel industry is thriving now and it was dead when I came to office." White House, Remarks by President 
Trump at Signing of Executive Order, "Strengthening Buy-American Preferences for Infrastructure Projects," 
31 January 2019.   
75 The import relief to those industries is questionable under US law which requires a path to "positive 
adjustment" and a showing that the relief will "provide greater economic and social benefits than costs." See 
19 USC § 2251(a). Furthermore, the absence of US domestic judicial review of such import relief is in tension 
with GATT Article X:3(b). 
76 White House, What You Need to Know About President Donald J. Trump's Actions Responding to China's 
Unfair Trade Practices, 6 April 2018. 
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USTR has not lodged a WTO case against China for the illegal use of either industrial 
subsidies or export restraints.77 This omission is especially puzzling because, as noted 
above, USTR argues that "China flouts the rules to achieve industrial policy objectives."78 
So far, the Administration has failed to put foward any response to WTO-illegal subsidies 
and export restraints by China.  
A scheme to utilize Section 301 sanctions against those subsidies would be problematic. 
Sanctions will be most effective when focused on one outcome and less effective when 
employed as a Swiss army knife79 to seek multiple outcomes. The utility of Section 301 
sanctions may also depend on whether the target behaviour is itself wrongful as a violation 
of legal or other norms.  
Another problem with the utility of Section 301 sanctions against China for subsidies or 
export restraints is the fact that China would call attention to the hypocrisy80 of the U.S. 
position, since the US government incessantly uses both subsidies and export restraints. 
Indeed in 2018, Congress and the Trump Administration worked together to strengthen the 
U.S. Department of Commerce's export control programs with the announced policy 
purpose of maintaining US leadership in science, technology, engineering and 
manufacturing.81  
Establishing better disciplines for the use of industrial policy instruments such as subsidies, 
export controls, and technical barriers is a matter on which future WTO negotiations should 
focus. Yet defining proper versus improper industrial policies is quite difficult. For 
example, the Trump Administration's criticisms of the Made in China 2025 initiative82 fail 
to take into account the positive externalities from China's green technology subsidies. 
 
3. Discriminatory or unjustified trade barriers. 
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and regulatory hurdles are neither inherently wrongful nor a 
violation of WTO law. Yet, they will be a violation of WTO law if they do not meet the 
stringent conditions in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) or the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). 
Discriminatory NTBs on products would be a violation of the TBT Agreement if the 
discrimination is not based on a legitimate regulatory distinction.  
                                               
77 A panel against China requested by the Obama Administration was composed at the beginning of the Trump 
Administration on the subject of China's agricultural support. The cause of action in this case is "support" 
under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, not subsidies under the SCM Agreement. Recently, the panel 
report was released, and the panel found that China was out of compliance with the WTO Agriculture 
Agreement. China – Domestic Support for Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS511/R, 
circulated 28 February 2019.  
78 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8. 
79 Kahn R, Have sanctions become the Swiss army knife of U.S. foreign policy?. Council on Foreign Relations, 
24 July 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/have-sanctions-become-swiss-army-knife-us-foreign-policy 
80 Bacchus J "Do as I say, not as I do": Trump's sizable China hypocrisy, The Hill, 25 January 2019, 
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/426946-do-as-i-say-not-as-i-do-trumps-sizable-china-hypocrisy 
81 50 USC § 4812.  
82 USTR, Update concerning China's acts, policies and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual 
property, and innovation, 20 November 2018, p. 8.  
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Oddly, the Trump Administration has not filed any TBT or SPS cases against China, and so 
the Administration misses an opportunity to demonstrate unfair and illegal actions by China 
affecting US exporters. NTBs do appear to be part of the ongoing US trade talks with China, 
and any deal reached will likely contain some ad hoc concessions by China. Yet by failing 
to frame the US agenda as seeking to get China to comply with the WTO's regulatory norms, 
the United States will likely fail to achieve systemic changes in the way that China writes 
its NTBs.  
China's high tariffs are neither WTO-illegal nor wrongful per se. Of course, both China and 
the United States would be better off if China lowered its tariffs. The best way to secure 
that win-win outcome is through market access negotiations at the WTO. Unfortunately, 
USTR under the Trump (and Obama) Administration has not championed a successful 
conclusion of the WTO Doha Round tariff negotiations.  
 
4. Agricultural import bans.  
An import ban on agricultural products violates GATT Article XI:1 and is therefore 
wrongful. Back in August 2017, the Trump Administration lodged a WTO case (DS517) 
against China regarding tariff-rate quotas on wheat, rice, and corn. The lawsuit alleges that 
these quotas violate provisions in GATT and in China's accession agreement.83 In April 
2019, the panel found multiple violations of China's accession obligations.  
The Trump Administration has failed to lodge a WTO case against any Chinese agricultural 
import ban such as a ban on US poultry.  
 
5. Subsidies for added industrial capacity.  
The use of non-agricultural subsidies to promote capacity is an illegal SCM actionable 
subsidy if the production or export causes adverse effects on trading partners. A subsidy 
intended only to raise production distorts markets and is considered wrongful by the trading 
system, which prioritizes competing producer interests over consumer interests.  
Although the terms "excess capacity" and "overproduction" are intended to be pejorative, 
the non-legitimacy of such conditions is contestable. In open, market-oriented economies 
driven by supply and demand, excess capacity and overproduction are normal phenomenon 
that are corrected by the market. If China produces more steel or aluminium than it will use 
domestically, such behaviour is not inherently wrong. For any commodity in an open world 
economy, one would expect that some countries would produce more than they need 
domestically and other countries would produce less than what they need. The WTO 
subsidy rules lay out what is legally improper, but that status does not necessarily match 
any economic concept of irrational or anti-competitive behaviour, or behaviour that 
externalizes trans-border costs.  
If excessive global steel production causes social or employment problems, the most logical 
solution would be a multilateral commodity agreement negotiated outside of the WTO. The 
WTO recognizes the legitimacy of commodity agreements (in GATT Article XX(h)). In 
                                               
83 China – Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS517/R, 18 April 
2019. 
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2016, the G-20 established a Global Forum on Excess Steel Capacity. Unfortunately, those 
global talks have been held without transparency so cannot be reported on in this study.  
The Trump Administration has not lodged any WTO complaints to challenge China's 
subsidies that promote excess capacity. For steel, the Administration has responded to 
Chinese overcapacity by imposing protective tariffs under Section 232 (of the Trade 
Expansion Act) and by imposing numerous countervailing duties tied to injurious subsidies. 
Although the US steel tariffs have been effective in raising US capacity utilization, I have 
not seen any studies of whether the tariffs have reduced China's steelmaking capacity.  
 
6. Involuntary licensing requirements.  
Requiring US companies to license intellectual property at less than economic value is a 
WTO violation. To its credit, the Trump Administration has lodged a WTO challenge under 
TRIPS Articles 3 and 28. Nevertheless, USTR delayed in obtaining the WTO panel until 
late November 2018, over 15 months after Trump triggered a USTR Section 301 
investigation and many months after USTR imposed unilateral sanctions.   
This US litigation against China has been poorly executed. The cause of action in the current 
WTO panel (DS542) is too narrow because USTR neglected to bring licensing claims under 
paragraph 256 of the China Working Party Report. If China's licensing practices 
discriminate against the United States, then USTR also failed to bring claims under TRIPS 
Article 4. If China's licensing practices apply to other countries equally, then USTR missed 
an opportunity to recruit similarly affected WTO allies to join a case against China. WTO 
cases with multiple complainants typically do well before WTO tribunals.  
 
7. Non-Transparency.  
The WTO has two kinds of transparency requirements: domestic and international. The 
domestic requirements are for publication and disclosure in China for the benefit of 
domestic and foreign persons. The international requirements are for notification to the 
WTO for the direct benefit of other WTO Members and the indirect benefit of economic 
and social actors.   
In 2019, USTR publicly reported its findings regarding "China's extremely poor record of 
adhering to transparency obligations as a WTO member."84 So far, however, the 
Administration has filed only one WTO case against China regarding transparency, and that 
case (DS 517) covers only wheat, grain, rice, and corn. In mid-April 2019, the panel ruled 
against China.  
This timid US litigation strategy is especially self-defeating since the United States was the 
leading proponent during China's accession negotiations for imposing numerous WTO-plus 
transparency rules in China's accession agreement that are tougher than the transparency 
requirements that apply to other WTO Members.85 The Trump Administration has roundly 
                                               
84 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 3.   
85 Yamaoka (2013), pp. 153–156 (taxonomy). 
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complained about the terms of China's entry into the WTO,86 but the Administration has 
failed to take advantage of the many favourable terms for WTO incumbents (like the US) 
that provide for numerous WTO causes of action against China. The law of WTO 
transparency is already extensive, but certainly new WTO negotiations on transparency 
would be useful, including to universalize China's enhanced transparency obligations.  
 
8. Improper trade remedies.  
Trade remedies include antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard duties. As noted above, 
the Trump Administration complains that "China has been a particularly bad actor when it 
comes to trade remedies."87 The record shows that in eight WTO cases, China was found to 
have violated trade remedy rules.88 None of those eight cases were brought by the Trump 
Administration, and during the Trump Administration, USTR has not lodged any new trade 
remedy cases against China. Other than vapidly labelling China a "bad actor," the Trump 
Administration has not put forward any strategy to address China's misconduct on trade 
remedies. Whether eight trade remedy violations by China renders that country a "bad actor" 
is a matter on which reasonable observers could differ.  
No reasonable observer could doubt that the United States is a "bad actor" on trade remedies 
because the United States has lost an obscene number – currently 49 – WTO trade remedy 
cases brought against the US.89 Indeed, the United States is the WTO's most flagrant bad 
actor on trade remedies because the United States has lost far more trade remedy cases than 
any other WTO member has.90 During the Trump Administration, five new trade remedy 
cases against the US have been assigned to WTO panels.91 US Secretary of Commerce 
Wilbur Ross accuses China of "highly protectionist behaviour"92 without any sense of 
shame that the WTO-illegal trade remedies administered by the Commerce Department also 
afford protection. 
Ideally, the WTO would carry out negotiations to better discipline improper trade remedies. 
Unfortunately, trade remedies have been embedded into the protectionist routines of many 
governments, and so this issue is probably too polarized for WTO legal reform to be 
achievable. 
 
                                               
86 In 2018, USTR declared that "it seems clear that the United States erred in supporting China's entry into the 
WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China's embrace of an open, market-oriented 
trade regime." USTR, 2017 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, January 2018, p. 2.  
87 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 8. 
88 WTO Cases 427, 483, 454 + 460, 414, 440, 427, 425, 414. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order 
of final decision. Cases that appear more than once involve follow-on compliance proceedings.  
89 WTO Cases 534, 523 (under appeal), 505 (under appeal), 437 (under appeal), 488, 471, 464, 429, 437, 436, 
449, 422, 404, 382, 379, 402, 383, 302 + 294, 350, 345, 343, 344, 268, 335, 322, 264, 294, 257, 282, 212, 
296, 268, 264, 277, 257, 248 + 249 + 251 + 252 + 253 + 254 + 258 + 259, 234, 212, 213, 236, 206, 202, 184, 
177 + 178, 179, 166, 136 + 162, 138, 99. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order of final decision. 
Cases that appear more than once involve follow-on compliance proceedings 
90 By way of comparison, the EU has lost 11 trade remedy proceedings: WTO Cases 486, 480, 442, 473, 397, 
405, 337, 299, 219, 141 (twice). 
91 WTO Cases 436, 533, 534, 539, 536 (order of establishment).  
92 China way more protectionist than US, says Trump official, South China Morning Post, 25 January 2018, 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2130520/china-way-more-protectionist-us-says-trump-official 
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9. Data localization.  
Data localization, that is, a governmental requirement to store data in the host country, can 
be one type of digital protectionism.93 No one disputes that China engages in digital 
protectionism. Indeed, the Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index finds China to have by far 
the most restrictive policy for digital trade.94 
The Trump Administration claims that China forces foreign companies to localize data 
within China. Data localization is not necessarily wrongful as there may be legitimate 
regulatory justification including privacy and public security. One recent study found that 
China's localization measures violate the GATS Agreement.95 So far, however, the Trump 
Administration has not lodged any GATS case against China. Other than labelling China a 
data localizer, the Trump Administration has not laid out any strategy to address China's 
practices on data localization.  
The WTO has a role in policing digital protectionism because the WTO can be an arbiter of 
when domestic regulation is administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner 
(see GATS Article VI:1). Nevertheless, WTO rules may not cover data itself,96 and the 
disciplines for the regulation of traded digital services may be narrower than the disciplines 
for regulation of products. At the time that GATS rules were written in the early 1990s, 
digital protectionism had not yet become an important international concern.  
Back in 2001, I advocated WTO negotiations to open up internet market access.97 Little has 
been accomplished since then on that problem or the broader problems of digital trade 
barriers. The WTO's inability to make progress in the intervening years leads me to wonder 
whether the negotiation of such issues should be pursued in more specialised international 
fora rather than being reserved for the WTO. 
The Trump Administration states that it is "initiating exploratory work on possible future 
negotiations" on digital trade.98 So far, however, the Administration's actions on data 
localization have been feeble.99 Indeed to date, the Administration failed to propose a set of 
comprehensive norms to address digital protectionism. 
                                               
93 Aaronson (2018), pp. 10–11. 
94 Ferracane MF et al., Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index. European Centre for International Political 
Economy, April 2018, pp. 6 (overall conclusion), 54–55 (China's data localization), https://ecipe.org/dte/dte-
report 
95 Crosby D (2016), Analysis of data localization measures under WTO services trade rules and commitments. 
E15, March 2016, http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Policy-Brief-Crosby-Final.pdf 
96 The WTO law status of digital trade is ambiguous. Data may be a WTO good or a service or both or neither. 
Many things with value, such as money and real property, are neither a good nor a service. Data may likewise 
not be a good or a service. Some clarification emerges from WTO legal text and subsequent practice. For 
example, when data is in an electronic form of something that is a good (like a book), then the electronic book 
is considered a good. The WTO agreement of 1998 to pledge not to impose customs duties on electronic 
transmissions (WT/MIN(98)/DEC2, 25 May 1998) may suggest that such transmissions are a good. That 
various GATS Agreements cover "data processing”, "transfers of data”, and "data transmission" may suggest 
that working on data is a service. GATS Article XIV(c)(ii) posits that regulation of the use of personal data is 
the regulation of a GATS service. 
97 Charnovitz (2001), p. 104. 
98 https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/march/2018-fact-sheet-key-barriers-
digital. 
99 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the 
Trade Agreements Program, March 2019, Annual Report, p. 64. 
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10. China's retaliation.  
China is retaliating against both of the Trump Administration's unilateral tariffs imposed 
under Sections 232 and 301.100 Each of these retaliatory actions violate WTO rules 
(especially GATT Arts. I and II) and, for that reason, the retaliation is wrongful. The Trump 
Administration has lodged a WTO case against China's Section 232 retaliation (DS 558), 
but has not brought a case against the Section 301 retaliation.  
China commenced its Section 232 retaliation in April 2018, and at that moment, there was 
a good argument that China (and other countries) had the right to retaliate under WTO 
safeguard rules against the US steel tariffs that had begun in March 2018.101 After all, the 
title of Section 232 is "Safeguarding National Security"102 and Section 232 authorizes tariffs 
that are similar to the tariffs that could be employed in a conventional safeguard. 
Subsequently, however, the Appellate Body interpreted WTO safeguard law in a narrow 
way that had the effect of cutting out the ground under the argument for the legitimacy of 
retaliation against Section 232 tariffs.  
The threshold question for Section 232 is whether it is a WTO safeguard. The legal case in 
support of China's retaliation against Section 232 tariffs was that the US tariffs are disguised 
safeguard tariffs for which an affected country can exercise retaliation rights under GATT 
Article XIX:3(a). Yet in August 2018, the Appellate Body held that to qualify as a WTO 
safeguard, a tariff increase "must be designed to prevent or remedy serious injury to the 
Member's domestic industry caused or threatened by increased imports" of the product.103 
Although Section 232 provides a remedy against imports, the terms of Section 232 do not 
require either serious injury or increased imports. Because those prerequisites are absent 
from the statutory text of Section 232, a WTO panel considering such retaliation case will 
find that the Section 232 measures are not a safeguard and therefore that China's retaliation 
is illegal.  
Given this subsequent development in WTO jurisprudence, China should withdraw its 
retaliation. The interposition of subsequent WTO case-law can render illegal a measure that 
was consistent with WTO law at the time it was instituted. This clarification in WTO law 
gives USTR a right to claim collateral estoppel from a new and unrelated WTO judicial 
holding. Ironically, the force of precedent in WTO jurisprudence – a common judicial 
practice now being opposed by USTR – will grant the United States a win in the ongoing 
Section 232 disputes at the WTO.  
China's has also retaliated against the Section 301 tariffs. This retaliation flouts WTO law, 
particularly GATT Articles I and II and DSU Article 23. (USTR has not brought a WTO 
                                               
100 Lu Z, Schott, Jeffrey J., How is China retaliating for US national security tariffs on steel and aluminum?. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), 9 April 2018; Bown CP et al., China's retaliation to 
Trump's tariffs, PIIE, 22 June 2018. 
101 Charnovitz S, EU can retaliate immediately against Trump's metal tariffs. 2 March 2018, 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/eu-can-retaliate-immediately-against-trumps-metal-
tariffs.html 
102 19 USC § 1862. 
103 WTO, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron and Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS490, 496 (adopted 27 August 2018), para. 5.60. 
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case against China for this retaliation.104) China's impulse to hit back is understandable, but 
the tariffs are legally wrongful and China should repeal its retaliation. China's retaliation 
may also lead to serious environmental consequences from distorting trade.105   
The Trump Administration responded to China's retaliation against Section 301 tariffs by 
USTR's decision to impose $200 billion in additional Section 301 tariffs on China. This 
response shows that China's illegal retaliation was a blunder because it gave the United 
States an excuse to quadruple down on Section 301 sanctions. The Trump Administration 
sees itself in a winning position because there are much higher imports from China into the 
US than from the US into China.  
The second tranche of Section 301 tariffs is just as WTO-illegal as the first tranche was. No 
unilateral tariffs imposed via Section 301 could ever be legal under WTO rules unless 
imposed as a DSB-authorized suspension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO). To 
its credit, China lodged a WTO case against the Section 301 tariffs (DS543), but so far, 
China has held off on securing the appointment of a panel. This delay may be politically 
connected to the Trump Administration's demand in ongoing US-China bilateral trade talks 
for China to agree not to bring future WTO challenges against US unilateral enforcement 
of the prospective China-US deal.   
 
11. Lack of market-oriented policies.  
The Trump Administration complains that China's economic policies since joining the 
WTO have not met the expectations of the United States and other WTO members.  
According to USTR, "When China acceded to the WTO in 2001, it voluntarily agreed to 
embrace the WTO’s open-market-oriented approach and embed it in its trading system and 
institutions."106 Furthermore, "Through China’s commitments and representations, WTO 
members understood that China intended to dismantle existing state-led, mercantilist 
policies and practices...."107  These complaints raise the fundamental question of what duty 
China owes to the WTO regarding China's economic and trade policies. 
To analyse this question, one should start with general WTO law. Contrary to the 
suggestions of the Trump Administration, the WTO does not require its members to adhere 
to any particular economic or political system. Nowhere does the WTO Agreement define 
the role of the state in relation to the market or civil society. The WTO rule that may come 
the closest to addressing economic systems is SCM Article 29 (Transformation into a 
Market Economy), but this provision stops short of requiring a government to effectuate 
such a transformation. Nor does the WTO constitution contain a provision to expel a 
Member that renounces market-oriented policies.  
Although joining the WTO by accession does not in itself entail any special responsibilities 
regarding market friendliness, China's accession agreement does cover aspects of its 
economic system. For example, China reported that it had the objective of establishing and 
                                               
104 But consultations are ongoing in DS565. 
105 Sax S, Millions of acres of the Amazon are at risk due to the trade war between the U.S. and China, Pacific 
Standard, 18 April 2019, https://psmag.com/economics/amazon-could-be-biggest-casualty-of-us-china-trade-
war 
106 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 5. 
107 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 5. 
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improving the socialist market economy.108 But China's Accession Agreement does not 
commit China to adopt "market-oriented" policies and mentions that term only in one 
sentence wherein China notes that it is "undertaking market-oriented reform in the 
agricultural sector."109 China's Accession Agreement does not contain any commitment by 
China to transform its economy or to abandon mercantilism. The Trump Administration is 
trying to insinuate rules into China's Accession Agreement that it wishes were there, but are 
not.  
The issue of how broadly to interpret applicant WTO-plus accession obligations has 
occasionally arisen in WTO dispute settlement. In my view, such obligations should be 
interpreted narrowly contra proferentem. Under this principle, if a provision in a contract 
is ambiguous, then the tribunal should adopt an interpretation that works against the party 
who drafted that wording in the contract. 
To apply this concept to the WTO, the China Accession Agreement is a contract-like 
international agreement between the WTO and China drafted by the WTO and agreed to by 
China. Although the applicant China had a role in accession negotiations, the key 
documents were drafted by WTO Members (led by the United States) in WTO bodies that 
did not include China. 
In seeking to join the WTO, China made hundreds of detailed accession commitments. To 
quote a contemporary WTO Secretariat posting, "As a result of this negotiation, China has 
agreed to undertake a series of important commitments to open and liberalize its regime in 
order to better integrate in the world economy and offer a more predictable environment for 
trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules."110 In my view, China should 
be held to those "important commitments" which is why this article has expressed 
disappointment that the Trump Administration has brought only one accession-based 
complaint against China.  Yet, holding China to its own commitments is quite different from 
asserting that China has failed to keep promises that China in fact did not make.  
In my view, the Trump and Obama Administration should have lodged more cases against 
China based on China's extraordinary accession commitments. For the Administration to 
call China a WTO violator without backing up that assertion in a tribunal of law evidences 
cowardice if not dishonesty. The best litigation strategy for the US would have been to file 
a series of cases under each of the WTO agreements. But if the Administration had also 
chosen to push the envelope by filing a broad case against China for its "state-led, 
mercantilist approach to the economy and trade,"111 I would have supported that too. 
Disciplining large non-market economies is a difficult challenge for the trading system. 
Rather than use the WTO, the Obama Administration pursued a flawed geopolitical strategy 
to craft better rules in the TPP and then to seek to pressure China into adhering to these 
rules. This strategy was flawed for three reasons: First, the rules achieved in the TPP fall 
far short of the market economy rules needed to transform the alleged pathologies in China's 
economy. Second, the idea of refusing to invite China to join the TPP and then seeking to 
isolate China economically was delusional given China's size as the world's largest trader. 
                                               
108 WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001, para. 6. 
109 WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001, para. 115. 
110 WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference approves China's Accession, 10 November 2001, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm 
111 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 2. 
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Third, the tactic was naive politically in ignoring China's historic sensitivity to rules being 
foisted on it through unequal treaties. A further flaw in Obama's TPP containment strategy 
was the failure of his Administration to garner US public support for the TPP project. 
Notably, all of the leading presidential candidates to succeed Obama opposed Obama's TPP. 
Choosing the extent of market-oriented policies is a matter that WTO subsidiarity leaves to 
governments. While governments need not be clones of each other, there is a role for trade 
agreements to nudge governments toward best practices in regulation, deregulation, and 
privatization. In some areas, tight rules may be useful, but in others, governments should be 
able to retain their diversity and policy space. While internationally-agreed norms play an 
important role in improving domestic policies, such norms should not seek to displace the 
role of competition between countries as a way to get governments to lift standards.   
 
12. High bilateral trade deficit.  
President Trump has constantly complained about the high US trade deficit with China. In 
2018, the bilateral goods deficit was $419 billion, the highest level ever.112 A bilateral trade 
deficit in goods is not wrongful per se and is not WTO-illegal. The US trade deficit with 
China may be more interesting than the US deficit with Chad, but that is only because China 
is much bigger than Chad, not because the US-China deficit is a meaningful policy target. 
Although the Trump Administration complains about state-led mercantilism, nothing can 
be more mercantilist than the demands of the Administration for the bilateral trade balance 
with China to be "more equitable."113  
All things being equal, a higher trade deficit in goods and services wreaks greater negative 
impact on domestic import-competing industry than a lower trade deficit does. The most 
meaningful bilateral trade numbers cover both goods and services, and in 2018, that goods 
and services deficit with China was $379 billion.114 Thus, undertaking structural economic 
changes that would lower the $379 billion deficit with China is a good idea.  
A US trade deficit with China means that US consumers and producers buy more from 
China than Chinese consumers and producers buy from the United States. The least coercive 
way to address this imbalance is for the United States to expand US exports of goods and 
services to China. By contrast, direct action to reduce US imports from China entails 
coercion and infringes freedom. 
Many targeted policy reforms to expand US exports have been suggested. For example, the 
US government could reduce its gargantuan budget deficit, which has been expanding under 
the Trump Administration. A budget deficit pulls in foreign capital that cannot be used to 
purchase US exports. The US government could make US exports more competitive by 
reducing production costs stemming from underinvestment in infrastructure, 
underinvestment in Chinese language training, and overregulation of US companies. The 
US government could also eliminate unnecessary US export controls. Trump's new tariffs 
on China have had the indirect effect of reducing Chinese demand for high-tech US products 
such as iPhones. That provides yet another reason to withdraw the Section 301 tariffs. 
                                               
112 https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html 
113 White House, Statement from the President Regarding Trade with China, 18 June 2018. 
114 https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2019-03/trad0119.pdf (BOP basis) 
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Unfortunately, the Trump Administration is not pursuing any of those constructive remedies 
to boost US exports. Instead, the Trump Administration appears to be using two tactics to 
lower the US trade deficit with China.  
First, the President is asking China for a purchase agreement with monetary import targets 
for US goods.115 This request is cynical because the Administration on one side of its mouth 
is demanding that the Chinese government exercise greater management of its trade while 
on the other side of its mouth, the Administration demands that the Chinese government be 
more market-oriented and less statist. The request is also problematic for third parties 
because if China commits to importing more from the US, then China may reduce imports 
from other WTO member countries. Any quantitative US-China trade agreement may run 
afoul of Article 11.1(b) of the WTO Safeguards Agreement which forbids arrangements 
involving "export or import surveillance" when such arrangements afford protection. In 
addition, should China's government intervene to dictate the origin of goods purchased by 
state-invested or state-owned enterprises, that would violate one of China's accession 
commitments.116  
The second tactic is to impose tariffs on China in order to lower imports from China. That 
result has not clearly happened yet, but with a high enough tariff, it would. One thing that 
is clear is that most of the Trump Administration's new tariffs against China violate WTO 
rules. The Section 301 tariffs violate GATT Articles I and II. The Section 232 tariffs violate 
GATT Articles I and II and are not justified under the national security exception in GATT 
Article XXI.117 The Section 201 tariffs on washing machines violate GATT Article XIX 
because the US government failed to make any determination on "unforeseen 
developments.” The US safeguard on solar panels may also violate GATT Article XIX.   
China's high trade surplus with the United States should be subject to WTO tariff 
negotiations. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has not shown any interest in the 
Doha Round or a renamed new trade round. China agreed to lower its tariffs and other 
barriers as part of its accession negotiations circa 1999, but 20 years later, China should do 
so again. Likewise, over 25 years after the conclusion of Uruguay Round tariff negotiations, 
a new round of liberalization by the United States is long overdue. 
 
13. Unharmonized tariffs and taxes.  
Trump's call for China and US tariffs and taxes to be mirrored or reciprocal is perhaps his 
most perverse recommendation. For the United States to fail to match China's taxes and 
tariffs is hardly wrongful. Nor are non-matching taxes and tariffs a violation of WTO rules. 
Certainly, the US and China could negotiate tariff and tax bindings within the WTO to seek 
fiscal harmonization. What cannot be done is for China and the US to harmonize higher 
                                               
115 White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of a Presidential Memorandum Targeting China's 
Economic Aggression, 22 March 2018; Sukin G, Mnuchin says China will buy $1.2 trillion in U.S. goods, 22 
February 2019, https://www.axios.com/us-china-currency-deal-trump-trade-war-0d1f5de8-26f5-42f1-becd-
102f8106b67c.html 
116 WTO, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 2001, para. 46. A measure 
mandating the importation of goods from a favoured country is an GATT Article I violation. 
117 Charnovitz (2018), pp. 239–240; Pinchis-Paulsen M, Trade multilateralism and national security: 
Antinomies in the history of the International Trade Organization, 2019, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353426 
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tariffs and taxes on each other because that would violate the most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
rule.  
The idea that the United States would delegate to China the setting of US tax and tariff 
levels is fiscally unwise. Allowing China to determine US fiscal policy is also a violation 
of US constitutional principles of self-government. This deference to China is a surprising 
recommendation for the Trump Administration which has declared that: "Trade policy, like 
tax policy, must reflect the wishes, concerns, and priorities of the American people – and 
should not be dictated by technocrats who are not responsible to Americans. The United 
States remains an independent nation, and our trade policy will be made here – not in 
Geneva."118 Made in Washington except when Trump calls for US taxes and tariffs to be 
made in Beijing! 
The Trump Administration is right in suggesting that China should lower its high tariffs. 
This is the sort of goal that could properly be addressed in a new round of WTO 
negotiations. Unfortunately, Trump's USTR (and before it Obama's USTR) failed to press 
for such negotiations.  
If China and the US had a free trade agreement (FTA), then the tariffs of both countries 
could be harmonized to zero. The goal of joining China in an FTA has never been suggested 
by the Trump Administration. Indeed, in the negotiations for a new trade agreement 
between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, the Trump Administration insisted on 
adding a new provision (Article 32.10) to discourage any North American country from 
negotiating an FTA with China.119 
 
14. Belt and Road.  
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is China's major international development investment 
initiative to expand trade-related foreign infrastructure. BRI is designed not only to expand 
China's trade, but also to promote development and connectivity to many countries around 
China. Begun only six years ago, BRI is already having a major economic and political 
impact. Countries that need to improve their infrastructure are signing on despite 
misgivings.120  
Since BRI does not directly involve the United States, the carping at BRI by the Trump 
Administration can only be the result of envy at the leadership, deep pockets, and 
administrative prowess shown by China. No question, the Trump Administration has a lot 
to envy because it is failing to achieve any major infrastructure program abroad or at home. 
For the Trump Administration, ambitious infrastructure means a wall at the Mexican border 
and even that ill-advised project is not being achieved.  
USTR's complaint that BRI "fails to adhere to internationally accepted best practices in 
infrastructure development and government procurement"121 leads to some questions: Do 
                                               
118 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27.  
119 Blanchfield M, Beijing attacks USMCA clause seen as blocking efforts to expand trade with Canada, 
Mexico. 5 October 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/usmca-nafta-china-trade-1.4852269 
120 Lau S, Italy may be ready to open up four ports to Chinese investment under "Belt and Road Initiative". 
19 March 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3002305/italy-may-be-ready-open-
four-ports-chinese-investment-under 
121 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 15.  
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the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 17.1–17.5 cover best practices in 
development financing? What are "best practices" in infrastructure development? How 
much of the success of BRI is owed to the inadequacy of development financing from 
advanced economies? Such questions are important, but cannot be explored here. 
However well or poorly China follows best practices in development financing, very little 
of that touches on WTO law. Indeed, subsidies to foreign countries are omitted from 
coverage in the SCM Agreement. Thus, China's failure to follow best practices in BRI is 
not wrongful in world trade law.  In my view, the best practice mostly missing from BRI is 
that China has not built a sustainable development dimension into BRI and has not laid out 
a good plan to conduct environmental impact analysis.122  
Two respected international legal scholars, Julien Chaisse and Mituso Matsushita, view BRI 
as a way for China "to export its development model.123 Certainly, the broad scope of BRI 
turns it into a transnational issue for which China should engage in negotiations with key 
governments and international organizations. Based on the scope of BRI, the WTO seems 
an inapposite forum for such negotiations.  
So far, the Trump Administration has not instituted any trade actions specifically against 
BRI. The main response by the Administration to BRI has been to work with the US 
Congress to enact a new law to improve US development finance programs.124 The BUILD 
Act seeks to reorganize federal agencies with responsibilities for development finance and 
to expand US funding.125 The Act takes a step in the right direction of competing with China 
rather than coercing it.  
 
15. Lax environmental standards.  
The Trump Administration complains that China's lax environmental standards and weak 
enforcement of them helps China "dominate traditional manufacturing industries."126 The 
theory that lax environmental, health or safety standards can drive national economic 
success is controversial, and growing evidence shows that a business can enhance its 
competitiveness by improving environmental sustainability.127 For a government to 
maintain unjustifiably low environmental standards is wrongful, but such behaviour is not 
regulated by the WTO.  
The WTO did include fishery subsidies as a Doha Round issue, but that issue was a poor fit 
for the WTO. In general, environmental challenges should be addressed in international 
environmental fora and fishery challenges should be addressed in international fishery fora. 
As the eminent environmentalist Konrad von Moltke pointed out decades ago, an 
environmental issue migrates to the trading system only when it is not being successfully 
managed within the appropriate international regime.  
                                               
122 Murase S, "Belt and Road" from the viewpoint of international law. Unpublished manuscript 2018.  
123 Chaisse and Matsushita (2018), p. 163. 
124 Chatzky A, McBride J, China's massive Belt and Road Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 
February 2019. 
125 Even if the proposed $60 billion level funding level were approved by the US Congress (which seems 
doubtful), the US government funding would remain substantially less than the Chinese government funding. 
126 White House, Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China's economic aggression threatens the 
technology and intellectual property of the United States and the world, June 2018, p. 1. 
127 Esty (2019). 
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Many FTAs contain commitments regarding the enforcement of domestic environmental 
standards. For example, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) directs that "a party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from [...] 
its environmental laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those 
laws in order to encourage trade or investment between the Parties."128 At this time, neither 
China nor the United States is a party to the CPTPP.129 To my knowledge, no FTA has 
regulated the level of environmental standards (except to incorporate norms in mutually 
agreed multilateral environmental agreements).  
Whether the environmental, health, and safety standards of China and the United States are 
set at the right level is a proper matter of mutual interest especially when standards cover 
global issues, such as ocean pollution, air pollution, or waste. Lowering environmental 
standards can raise trade concerns, but so can the raising environmental standards. For 
example in 2018, China imposed a ban on recycled imports and plans a future ban on 
rubbish imports.130 This action directly affects the US economy because China has been a 
major destination for US recycling and trash exports.  
 
16. Securing natural resources.  
The Trump Administration complains that China uses a predatory debt trap model to secure 
natural resources. Depending on the facts as to predation and trapping, this may be wrongful 
behaviour. On the other hand, an ungenerous lending practice is not a WTO violation. 
Moreover, I am not aware of any pertinent international legal norms that cover such 
behaviour other than on tied aid. 
Certainly, appropriate sovereign lending terms are a topic ripe for multilateral or regional 
negotiations. The World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) could each be an appropriate forum for these 
discussions. In my view, the WTO would not be the right forum for those issues other than 
when related to trade governance capacity.  
 
17. Global misallocation of resources.  
The Trump Administration complains that China is misallocating global resources in a way 
that leaves everyone poorer. The proper allocation of resources is a key economic function 
typically left to markets. The Preamble to the WTO Agreement suggests that governments, 
                                               
128 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 3 March 2018, Article 
20.3.6. 
129 After the Trump Administration pulled the US out of the TPP, the remaining 11 nations renamed the 
Agreement as "Comprehensive and Progressive" and, in true Orwellian fashion, made it less comprehensive 
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https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/09/29/a-chinese-ban-on-rubbish-imports-is-shaking-up-the-
global-junk-trade 
 24 
24 
in their trade relations, should be "allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development [...]."131  
Notwithstanding that norm, the WTO has no rules regarding the proper allocation of 
resources. Adding such an issue to the WTO's agenda would not be a good idea because the 
WTO's agenda is already overloaded. Moreover, the WTO has performed poorly in 
negotiating numerous issues much more central to the WTO's mission. 
The beauty of markets is that they handle a task like allocating resources through the gainful 
and voluntary interaction of private actors. Allocation bureaucrats are not needed. The 
Administration's complaint seems to be that allocation decisions in China are too often 
being made administratively rather than in the market. Obviously, China could lodge the 
same complaint against the US given the numerous non-market allocations being imposed 
by the Trump Administration. 
The White House contends that a misallocation of resources can leave the Chinese people 
poorer than they would be in a world of efficient markets. In defending its economic 
aggression against China, USTR argues that "the distortions caused by China's non-market 
system" are bad not only for the United States, but for China too.132 I agree with both 
contentions and with USTR's similar claim that reforms in China to pursue an "open, 
market-oriented approach" will "also benefit China, by placing its economy on a more 
sustainable path [...]."133 The Trump Administration's insight is supported by the 
enlightened private sector. For example, Jamie Dimon, in his annual letter to JPMorgan 
Chase stockholders, recently explained: "We should only expect China to do what is in its 
own self-interest, but we believe that it should and will agree to some of the United States’ 
trade demands because, ultimately, the changes will create a stronger Chinese economy."134  
The paradox in this pressure on China to swallow its economic medicine is that  given how 
competitive135 China now is against the United States with one hand tied behind its back 
due to distorted allocations, who knows how much more economically powerful China 
would become once it improves its suboptimal economic policies.  
The worst misallocation of resources occurring in the world today is the excessive reliance 
on energy from fossil fuels. Such behaviour is wrongful in view of what scientists warn 
about the effects of carbon energy on climate change. The Trump Administration supports 
"promoting more efficient markets,"136 but the world's most egregious market inefficiency 
is the failure to internalize the costs of utilizing carbon energy. Neither China nor the US 
has appropriate carbon internalization policies. 
Instituting carbon charges falls within the wheelhouse of the climate regime. So far, the 
Paris Agreement has avoided instituting such policy norms. Even if one considers this 
                                               
131 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, 15 April 1994. 
132 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 6. 
133 USTR, 2018 USTR Report to Congress on China's WTO compliance, February 2019, p. 5. 
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Trade Agreements Program, March 2019, p. 2. 
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stance a failure in climate policy (as I do), no one should look to the WTO as a substitute 
forum for negotiating climate policies such as carbon charges or border adjustments. 
 
18. China's acquisitions in US.  
The Trump Administration complains that China directs and unfairly facilitates investment 
and acquisition to generate large-scale technology transfer from U.S. companies to Chinese 
entities. Neither outward foreign investments nor inward foreign investments are 
intrinsically wrongful in a global economy. Indeed, the movement of capital and technology 
across borders are normal processes that benefit both capital exporting and capital importing 
countries. 
The WTO is largely silent on the international acquisition of technology, but there is some 
soft law favouring openness. One WTO agreement calls on governments to "facilitate 
investment across international frontiers so as to increase the economic growth of all trading 
partners [...]."137 Another WTO agreement suggests that developed countries "should 
provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least developed country Members in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base."138 
The limited international investment law obligations in the WTO need to be read in 
conjunction with the extensive discretion that remains with national regulators to control 
inward foreign investment and acquisition of domestic enterprises and technologies. WTO 
rules would permit a government to bar inward foreign investment and foreign acquisition 
of domestic technology. Barring the importation of capital from one country, but not others, 
is subject to being examined pursuant to the non-discrimination rules of GATS Article II. 
If the Trump Administration wants to bar Chinese entities from making certain investments 
in the US or transferring technology back to China, then the US government would have 
prescriptive jurisdiction to enact and enforce national laws to accomplish that objective. 
Such laws are reviewable under WTO rules, but the United States has nearly complete 
discretion under the WTO to enforce such laws against China. The TRIPS Agreement 
regulates the protection of alien intellectual property, but the TRIPS Agreement does not 
mandate free trade in domestic intellectual property and technology. 
The Trump Administration is imposing Section 301 tariffs to punish China's efforts to invest 
in the United States, to acquire US companies that have cutting-edge technologies, and to 
transfer such technology back to China.139 As noted above, the use of Section 301 tariffs 
violates US obligations in the WTO.  
But not only are Section 301 tariffs internationally illegal, they are also grossly inefficient 
in targeting China's actions in the US. By far, the most effective instrument for the United 
States to use to regulate China's actions within the US territory is domestic regulation. For 
a sanctioning addict like the United States to waste sanction-sending resources to achieve a 
purpose that can be fully achieved under domestic law is feckless. The same point applies 
in No. 20 below.  
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 26 
26 
The particular domestic law that the United States uses to control foreign investments is 
notoriously unfair. The regulator is the President and the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS) who together can review foreign investments affecting 
national security broadly defined. CFIUS is a committee of federal officials without any 
public members. In CFIUS proceedings, neither the applicant foreign person nor the 
domestic counterparty enjoy any rights. Worse yet, the regulator has untrammelled 
discretion. The closed nature of the process makes it difficult for the public to see how 
arbitrarily foreign entities are being treated.  
Under the Trump Administration, the outrageous CFIUS process has gotten even worse 
following a new federal law passed by the Congress in 2018 that denies judicial review of 
the President's findings or actions.140 The recent ramping up of US regulation of domestic 
enterprises seeking foreign investment violates market principles141 and demonstrates the 
need for new international rules to discipline CFIUS-style regulations.142 
 
19. Corporate governance law.  
The Trump Administration complains that China uses corporate governance law "as a tool 
to advance China's strategic goals, rather than simply, as is the custom of international rules, 
to advance the profit-maximizing goals of the enterprise."143 Of the 20 claims reviewed 
here, this claim is the most fatuous. As noted above, this article does not attempt to reach 
the truth as to what is occurring in China. Thus, I will assume that China is using its 
corporate law to advance China's strategic goals. Corporate law, like any law, exists for the 
purpose of promoting the public interest.  
The Trump Administration claims that there is an international custom or international rule 
that enterprises should only advance their profit-maximizing goals. No evidence is put 
forward for that claim and I do not know of any. Certainly, the WTO does not have a rule 
mandating or suggesting that enterprises should maximize their profits. In the United States, 
no federal or state law assigns enterprises the duty of maximizing their profits.  
In a recent restatement of the basic principles of corporate law around the world, a group of 
experts explained:  
Contrary to widespread belief, corporate directors generally are not under a legal obligation to 
maximise profits for their shareholders. This is reflected in the acceptance in nearly all jurisdictions 
of some version of the business judgment rule, under which disinterested and informed directors have 
                                               
140 50 USC § 4565(e)(1). 
141 See Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union, Annexed Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions, 31 May 2018 ("The 
Ministers noted the following elements or indications that signal that market conditions exist for businesses 
and industries: [...] (2) decisions of enterprises on investments are freely determined and made in response to 
market signals;..."), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/may/joint-
statement-trilateral-meeting 
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the discretion to act in what they believe to be in the long-term interests of the company as a separate 
entity, even if it does not entail seeking to maximize short-term shareholder value.144 
I do not know what the latest trends are in Chinese corporate governance, but contrary to 
the claim of the Trump White House, if China is seeking to steer companies to pursue goals 
other than profit maximizing that would not place China out of the comparative mainstream 
nor diverge from the US approach. If instead of leaving corporate goals up to each company, 
China were to task its corporations to pursue sustainability and decent work and to refrain 
from corruption, such corporate law would not appear to impose any harm on the US 
economy.  
 
20. Cyber and intellectual property theft.  
The Trump Administration complains that China's government engages in "theft" of 
American technology. Such theft is illegal under U.S. law. Rather than improving 
enforcement of federal law, however, the Trump Administration in July 2018 imposed 
Section 301 tariffs on China to counter the thefts. Finally, in an apparent afterthought, the 
Administration began stepping up high-profile domestic enforcement actions against 
Chinese entities.145  
A proposition that either theft and espionage violates WTO law seems doubtful, but I 
reserve judgment.  No doubt exists that a Section 301 tariff against theft and espionage 
violates WTO law. Using the Section 301 instrument is especially paradoxical for a purpose 
for which straightforward penalties such as US criminal prosecutions are available. Whether 
US criminal law provides sufficient deterrence against perpetrators beyond the reach of US 
courts is a matter that should be considered. Some analysts have suggested that indicting 
wrongdoers is not sufficient, and that non-tariff sanctions against the responsible Chinese 
perpetrators are needed.146  
 
The analysis above of Trump's top 20 gripes about China's trade practices is summarized in 
Table 1 below: 
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                                                                 Table 1 
           Key Aspects of Trump's Top 20 Complaints About China's Behaviour 
 
Complaint Is behaviour 
wrongful? 
Does this 
behaviour 
violate WTO? 
Did 
Trump 
lodge 
WTO 
case? 
 
Are new WTO 
negotiations 
necessary? 
Are 
negotiations 
outside the 
WTO 
necessary? 
1. Forced 
technology 
transfer 
Yes Yes No No, but could 
be useful 
 
No 
2. Chinese 
industrial 
policies 
Depends on the 
facts 
Yes, depending 
on the facts 
 
No No, but could 
be useful 
No 
3. Non-tariff  
barriers and 
high tariffs  
 
Yes, if 
unjustifiable or 
discriminatory 
 
Yes, if 
unjustifiable or 
discriminatory 
No Yes, for tariffs No 
4. Agricultural 
import bans 
 
Yes Yes No No No 
5. Subsidies for 
added industrial 
capacity 
Yes, if no other 
policy purpose 
 
Yes No No, but could 
be useful 
No, but could 
be useful 
6. Involuntary 
licensing 
requirements 
 
Yes Yes Yes No, but could 
be useful 
No 
7. Disregard of 
transparency 
obligations 
 
Yes Yes Yes No, but could 
be useful 
No, but could 
be useful 
8. Improper 
trade remedies 
 
Yes Yes No Yes No 
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9. Data 
localization 
Yes, depending 
on the facts 
 
Yes, depending 
on the facts 
No Yes Yes 
10. China's 
tariff retaliation 
Yes Yes Yes for 
§232 
No for 
§301 
 
No No 
11. Lack of 
market-oriented 
policies 
 
No Maybe 
depending on 
future legal 
interpretation 
No Yes Yes, in some 
regimes 
12. High 
bilateral trade 
deficit 
 
No, but it is not 
optimal 
No No Yes No 
13. 
Unharmonized 
tariffs and taxes 
 
No No No No, not for 
harmonization 
in itself 
No 
14. Belt and 
Road 
No No No No Yes, in some 
regimes 
 
15. 
Unjustifiably 
lax 
environmental 
standards 
 
Yes No No No Yes, in 
environmental 
regimes 
 
16. Securing 
natural 
resources 
 
Depends on the 
facts 
No No No Yes 
17. Global 
misallocation of 
resources 
 
Yes No No No Yes, in the 
climate regime 
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18. China's 
acquisitions in 
US 
Not in general No No No This issue 
amenable to 
national law, 
but more 
international 
cooperation 
could be useful 
 
19. Corporate 
governance law 
 
No No No No No 
20. Cyber and 
intellectual 
property theft  
Yes Not generally No No This problem 
amenable to 
national law, 
but more 
international 
cooperation 
would be useful 
 
 
3.3 Overall Findings 
One of the most dangerous trade fallacies propounded by the Trump Administration is that 
its aggressive trade actions against China will "ensure that the costs of China's non-market 
economic system are borne by China, and not by the United States."147 Nothing can be 
further from reality. U.S. tariffs are paid by importers within the United States with the costs 
ultimately borne by either US domestic purchasers of imports or foreign exporters. A recent 
empirical study suggests that in this current episode, the costs are being borne by US 
consumers rather than Chinese exporters.148 While China may suffer some lost sales to the 
United States, the US economy definitely suffers harm. One analyst has recently predicted 
that "because China exports to Americans dwarf our exports to them, trade restrictions can 
inflict disproportionate harm to China's economy."149 This argument errs by looking only 
at the export side of the trade transaction and not looking at the harm caused by US tariffs 
to Americans.  
Besides being a double-edged weapon, US tariffs obscure the normative message that the 
United States should be communicating about China's misbehaviour. Instead, the US tariffs 
themselves become the message and China focuses its attention to how to defend itself from 
the assault by retaliating against the sender country and by shifting exports to third 
countries. In the US public arena, the processes to choose US tariff targets and award 
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exemptions to lawyered-up importers absorb most of the media's attention. This cybernetic 
failure renders the tariffs an incoherent and defective strategy for transforming China.  
As the Trump Administration will learn, the ad hoc nature of the Section 301 sanctions will 
make them difficult to remove in a negotiation with China. Because the sanctions are 
normless, a perfectionist-protectionist coalition is sure to rise up to fight against tariff 
removal. Both groups in the coalition will argue that the Administration should not be a 
patsy to empty promises by China. 
The Trump Administration's most serious normative failure is to engage China through 
power rather than law. The narrative is oddly disjunctive. The Trump's Administrations 
anti-China rhetoric often sounds in law. For example, USTR explained that "Unfortunately, 
China has a poor record when it comes to complying with WTO rules and observing the 
fundamental principles on which the WTO agreements are based."150 The White House 
declared that Trump "is following through on his pledge to take action to ensure that China 
finally plays by the rules."151 Trump himself has referred to China's "illicit trade practices" 
and to its "misconduct."152 Given these assertions, the Administration's multiple failures to 
bring legal complaints is a non-sequitur. 
The Administration has been remarkably candid as to why it has not invoked WTO dispute 
settlement: 
China has no fear of WTO dispute settlement, even as it continues to embrace a state-led mercantilist 
approach to the economy and trade [...].153 
No matter how many cases are brought at the WTO, China can always find a way to engage in 
market-distorting practices.154 
Any suggestion that the United States or other WTO members could address the numerous problems 
outlined in this [USTR] report solely by relying on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is naïve 
in theory, and likely to prove downright harmful in practice.155 
While the WTO dispute settlement process is of only limited value in dealing with China's non-market 
practices, the Chinese government is eager to draw upon the judicial activists at the WTO to protect 
its economic system.156 
USTR provides no evidence to back up these claims and I am not aware of any. Whether or 
not China fears WTO dispute settlement, the government of China's failure to comply after 
losing a WTO case would seem to be no worse than the US government's failure to comply. 
Instead, the Administration's true concern may be that continued compliance by China will 
put the spotlight on persistent non-compliance by the United States, especially on trade 
remedy violations. For the Trump Administration, WTO dispute settlement is a problem not 
a solution. That is why zeroing out the WTO Appellate Body is a higher priority for USTR 
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than lodging cases against China. Moreover, if there will not be an Appellate Body after 
2019, why bother bringing new legal cases against China? 
By failing to make legal arguments against China, the Trump Administration dilutes 
whatever normativity may exist for persuading the world of its claim that China is not 
playing by the rules. Many WTO experts agree that the Administration has missed an 
opportunity to file WTO cases against China.157 In the current trade war against China, the 
most notorious rule-breaker is the United States which is ignoring its DSU Article 23 
obligation to use the WTO dispute system rather than Section 301 and is ignoring its 
obligation not to impose unilateral tariffs on China. 
The Trump Administration's myopia regarding the benefits of challenging China's actions 
as a violation of WTO rules is strangely shared others who are quick to point out what China 
is doing wrong. The most maddening advocacy comes from the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, an advisory group established by Congress in 2000. In its 
most recent report (the 2018 report which is its 16th annual report) the taxpayer-funded 
Commission floats the idea that USTR should bring a "non-violation" case against China at 
the WTO.158 Besides missing the key point that China is violating the WTO, a non-violation 
case is difficult to win and hardly worth the effort as any resulting award is unenforceable 
due to DSU Article 26.1. 
In pointing out the obvious normative failures in the Trump Administration's strategy, I am 
certainly not suggesting that China always faithfully executes WTO law. Rather, my point 
is that the best way, and perhaps the only way, to get China to act more responsibly is to 
inculcate international legal norms into China's national trade practices. The Trump 
Administration's strategy to use coercion rather than reason to change China's behaviour 
may seem pragmatic and realist to Trump's team, but nothing could be more naive than to 
imagine that weapons that hurt the United States as much as (or more than) they hurt China 
will succeed in enabling the United States to dictate to China what China's economic 
policies will be.  
As explained above, the US strategy of bilateral bargaining with China in the shadow of US 
tariffs suffers the pathology of displacing law with power. Another dimension of the 
pathology is the displacement of the multilateral WTO negotiating forum with secretive 
US-China bilateral talks.  Other than No. 12 above, all of the US complaints about China 
reflect systemic issues that affect the WTO membership as a whole.  Should China pledge 
to reduce state control, the ensuing policies can externalize benefits to all WTO members, 
not just the US.  But there is also a danger of reaching exclusive US-China arrangements 
that would externalize costs on other WTO members.159   
 
4 Conclusion 
This study dissects America's top 20 charges against Chinese trade-related misbehaviour. 
The study finds that at least half of the charges (Nos. 1-10) violate WTO rules. Of those 10, 
                                               
157 For example, see Schoenbaum TJ, Chow DCK (2019), pp. 190–192. 
158 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018 Report to Congress, November 2018, p. 
22.  
159 Bown CP, Why the US needs allies in a trade war against China, Harvard Business Review Digital, 11 
December 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/12/why-the-u-s-needs-allies-in-a-trade-war-against-china 
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the Trump Administration has brought claims against only three of them (Nos. 6, 7, and 
10).  
China should be held to the international rule of law, but so should the United States. The 
US tariffs being imposed against China under the Sections 201, 232, and 301 schemes 
violate international trade law, and this US misbehaviour in the WTO obscures 
misbehaviour by China. The US Section 301 tariffs have been imposed in response to five 
types of alleged misbehaviour by China (Nos. 1, 6, 10, 18, and 20). The Section 201 and 
232 tariffs are not predicated on China's misbehaviour. 
Table 1 above reveals notable surprising features of the US trade war against China: Six of 
the US claims are for types of behaviour that are not inherently wrongful in a diverse world 
economy and that are not a WTO violation (Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, and 19). Four types 
raise policy issues that are more properly considered outside of the WTO and for which 
better international cooperation is needed (Nos. 14–17.) Two of the types (Nos. 18, 20) 
relate to China's activities within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States for which 
the Trump Administration has tightened up domestic regulation and enforcement. Yet, the 
Trump Administration is also using Section 301 sanctions against those two types. The use 
of Section 301 sanctions for Chinese investment (No. 18) is especially perverse as China 
owes no duty to the US until US regulators prescribe what movements of capital and 
technology are prohibited.  
Two of the claims (Nos. 12 and 18) ascribe to China's government full responsibility for 
actions that occur in large part in China's private sector. Seeking to make China's 
government accountable for private sector behaviour is consistent with the Trump 
Administration's assumptions as to the limited extent of market conditions in China. That 
logic is circular, however, because to achieve the changes that the Administration seeks in 
at least five claims (Nos. 1, 12, 17, 18, 19), the Chinese government will need to expand its 
control of private economic actors. 
Seven of the US claims raise systemic issues for which WTO law is said to be inadequate 
to govern problems related to large non-market economies (Nos. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11). Yet 
the Trump Administration has not promoted WTO negotiations for any of these issues. 
Instead, the most USTR has done is to co-author a Joint Scoping Paper with the EU and 
Japan regarding the need for stronger rules on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, 
the definition of a public body, and the identification of market-oriented conditions.160 
If there are to be new international norms to govern the competition between market and 
non-market economies, the norms and standards have to be based on competitive neutrality 
principles that apply to all countries and economic systems equally. USTR can pontificate 
that China "continues to embrace a state-led mercantilist approach to the economy and trade 
that is fundamentally incompatible with the open, market-based approach envisioned and 
followed by other WTO members.”161 Nevertheless, to many observers, the Trump 
Administration's trade policies also look state-led, mercantilist, closed, and non-market 
based. This is especially true of the industrial policies for steel, aluminum, and washing 
machines, the calculated selection of beneficiaries of Section  301 tariffs, the blocking of 
                                               
160 See Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union, Annexed Statement 3, Joint Statement on Market Oriented Conditions, 31 May 2018. 
161 USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 26. 
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China's inward investment into the United States, and Trump's recent expansion of Buy-
American requirements.162 
Decrying state capitalism is easy rhetorically, but when governments meet together to write 
rules, a granular approach is needed to unpack complex terms such as "state-led," 
"mercantilist," "open," and "market-based." How does an international regulator objectively 
determine when those indicated conditions exist? Are government policies to provide public 
goods state-led? Should steel "overcapacity" be addressed by market or non-market 
approaches? Will market-based policies be sufficient to address market failure? What 
strategies needed to control the pathologies of government failure?163 What rules should 
guide industrial policies in "open" economies? Should the SCM Agreement be expanded to 
cover implicit downstream subsidies? Anyone seeking to devise a code of fair competition 
between market and nonmarket economies will need to think through difficult questions 
such as these.    
The existential challenge facing the OECD countries is not low-cost imports from China, 
but rather how to maintain an attractive development model for the rest of the world. The 
key advantage for the United States, Europe, and Japan is the jointly-shared embedded 
commitment to rule of law, democratic institutions, free markets, effective regulatory 
structures, and international cooperation.  
The tragedy of the Trump Administration's economic aggression against China is its 
willingness to cast those principles aside in order to elicit ad hoc Chinese concessions. 
Whether or not the Chinese government agrees to alter some domestic policies, Trump's 
narcissistic economic war against China will erode the public's appreciation for the benefits 
of rule of law and international cooperation. By contrast, other than China's blunder in 
retaliating against the Section 301 tariffs, China has shown itself to be a WTO supporter 
that will not cave into US efforts to return the trading system to the law of the jungle.164 
China was among the many governments that brought a WTO case against the Section 232 
tariffs, and the recent WTO panel report in the Russia - Traffic in Transit case makes a win 
by the Section 232 plaintiffs much more likely.165   
The Administration's efforts to shut down the Appellate Body may make it impossible for 
the United States to prosecute cases against China in the WTO dispute system. This is 
puzzling at a time when Trump himself is bragging that because of his policies, "we're doing 
better even with WTO. We're winning cases all of a sudden because they know my 
attitude."166 Of course, the US cannot win WTO cases against China unless USTR is willing 
to do the heavy lifting to prepare and prosecute such cases.  
                                               
162 Hoe S et al., Trump's new Executive Order requires additional Buy American preferences for infrastructure 
projects. Covington, 7 February 2019, https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2019/02/trumps-new-
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163 Charnovitz (2010). 
164 Deng C, China defends WTO record as trade fight looms. Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2018 (discussing 
China's White Paper). Taking note of China's pro-legalization stance, USTR has complained that "It is very 
troubling to see that China believes that giving more authority to the Appellate Body would be in China's 
interest." USTR, 2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Annual Report, March 2019, p. 27. 
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By holding the Appellate Body hostage, the Trump Administration is apparently seeking to 
pressure other WTO members to agree to a change in DSU rules that would increase the 
likelihood of Appellate Body rulings against China as defendant and, at the same time, 
decrease the likelihood of rulings against the United States as defendant. Failing that first-
best outcome, the revealed preference of USTR seems to be to turn off WTO enforcement 
in order to preserve "policy space"167 for the US to impose WTO-illegal Section 301 and 
trade remedy tariffs against China. Rather than being viewed as a valuable public good, the 
judicial independence of the Appellate Body is despised by the Trump Administration as a 
restriction on US sovereignty.168 
Although US unilateral power may still be strong enough to humble China, the projection 
of US power cannot be the sole basis on which to lead the world.  Addressing the global 
problems of the 21st century — particularly climate, health, and cyberspace— will require 
more intensive intergovernmental cooperation buttressed by an effective international legal 
system.169  The Trump Administration's rejection of global governance on trade, climate, 
and other important areas of law is a misstep of major consequence.  Unlike the state of 
play when America rejected the League of Nations a century ago, this time there is a record 
of accomplishment by the multilateral system.   
For its overall strategy to reform China and provide US global leadership on trade, I give 
the Trump Administration a generous grade of "D". The best features are the WTO cases 
lodged against Nos. 6, 7, and 10 and the exemplary case studies demonstrating how not to 
carry out trade policy. Three of Trump's complaints against China (Nos. 2, 3, and 8) expose 
the double standards in US protectionism. Five of the US complaints (Nos. 11, 14, 15, 16, 
17) concern complex international problems for which the Administration has offered 
neither thoughtful ideas nor political leadership. The rest of Trump's trade strategy suffers 
for being poor lawyering (Nos. 1-11), mercantilist (No. 12), WTO-illegal (Nos. 1, 6, 10, 13, 
18, and 20), or nonsense (Nos. 13, 19). 
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